
Are We Prepared? Interviews With Leading Experts
from Medscape Infectious Diseases
Preparing for a Smallpox Attack
Medscape: The current plans in the United States for an attack with smallpox is "ring vaccination" (surveillance containment). Do you think this approach is the best for the United States? Is the ring strategy better than the Israeli plan to vaccinate everyone?
Dr. Foster: There are 3 options — surveillance containment of first responders, voluntary vaccination, and compulsory vaccination. Given that there are types of smallpox that might miss detection in the first 48 hours (early disease or hemorrhagic smallpox), vaccination of first responders would provide protection to health workers seeing the first few cases. Given the risk of vaccination, surveillance containment is the appropriate strategy for community protection.
Dr. Kaplan: I think the ring strategy is flawed in several ways. The argument is whether one should vaccinate just the right people (ring strategy) vs trying to protect everyone as quickly as possible (post-attack mass vaccination). Rather than devoting scarce resources to tracing, locating, and vaccinating what seem to be exactly the "right" people, it is much more efficient in all but the smallest of attacks to mass vaccinate and bring the population to herd immunity levels as rapidly as possible. This is what the Israelis would do, either post-attack or pre-attack if intelligence estimates suggest a high enough likelihood of attack, and I think it is a much wiser approach to the control of smallpox in today's situation where, unlike the countries of the WHO eradication campaign, we have next to no immunity in the population, people are very mobile, and terrorists are presumably trying to kill us.
Dr. Lutwick: Ring immunization, which worked well in eradication of natural smallpox, is not likely to be effective. If smallpox were effectively introduced into a large cohort of susceptibles, a large outbreak would no doubt result. Universal or at least widespread immunization might blunt this. It would be reasonable to immunize a cohort of individuals who, based on their employment, would likely be at risk for smallpox. This may assist in blunting the outbreak, but will not help those not in this cohort.
Medscape: What about the risks of the current smallpox vaccine, and the liability for adverse effects?
Dr. Temte: On one hand, there's an undefined threat, and on the other, we have a vaccine that has pretty unacceptable adverse effects. When we start talking about immunizing entire populations, I get very worried, especially about liability. I have patients who will not get their children immunized against measles because of the mythical fear of autism. We've changed our polio vaccine because of the very, very rare case of induced polio from the oral vaccine, around 8 to 10 cases a year. With smallpox vaccine, for example, 70% of kids might get a high fever that lasts 14 days. I don't want to be the physician dealing with the parent of the child who gets the fever and can't go to day care, the parent misses work, etc. Those are the grim realities in primary practice.
Dr. Zelicoff: Given the ACIP's [Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices] instructions and assumptions (primarily, that the risk of smallpox was "low" but not quantified), they made the right choice, simply because the existing vaccine is so damned problematic. There is no question that if we were to engage in mass vaccination, hundreds to thousands of people in the United States would die or be severely sickened because they are immunocompromised; the vaccine is a live virus ("vaccinia") which was known to cause terrible problems even 50 years ago, before we had 10% of the population immunosuppressed at any given time.
Dr. Lutwick: Estimates of deaths associated with widespread reintroduction of the smallpox vaccine have been in the range of 300. These numbers, however, are based on risks of complications of a vaccine in a population from more than 3 decades ago. There are quite a lot more immunocompromised people wandering around now than there were then (HIV, chemotherapy, organ transplants, etc). Even if you were able to avoid directly immunizing any known immunocompromised individual, there are lots of HIV+ people who do not know it and, more importantly, secondary spread of vaccinia virus from a healthy vaccinee to an immune-suppressed contact or a patient with eczema (eczema vaccinatum) will likely be more common than before and hike up the numbers related to morbidity and mortality from the vaccine.
Once deaths of "innocent" people start to occur from any vaccinia program, given the environment we live in, the clamoring for smallpox vaccination may end quickly unless the disease breaks out. In this regard, it is my understanding that the Vaccination Protection Against Litigation legislation does not cover smallpox vaccine. I am not sure what protection will be offered to whatever company was involved in making the old vaccine, and if that occurs, who is left to be sued but the poor docs who immunize the patients who get or die from vaccinia complications?
Medscape: What other options do we have?
Dr. Zelicoff: What the Committee did not say (it wasn't required to) is that our work does not stop with the acquisition of 300 million doses of vaccine (due, by the way, on or about January 2003). Rather, we must continue to develop both a new vaccine and antiviral drugs. In other words, we need a better set of choices than the sole option we currently have.
Dr. Lutwick: The development of more modern smallpox vaccines that could have substantially less "toxicity baggage" may obviate much of the debate about immunization. Besides a standard tissue culture product, DNA (genomic), oral transgenic plant, or idiotype-anti-idiotype vaccines might be even better immunologically tailored immunogens.
It has always been my concern that epidemic, significant human poxvirus infection would return. Even if BT smallpox or even accidental release of nonBT virus was a nonissue, I have always thought that other similar orthopox viruses such as monkeypox or "white" pox — given the right mutation or other genetic recombination — would eventually cause these agents to become more infectious and virulent in humans.
Medscape: What about reports of successful aerosolization of smallpox by the Russians in 1971?
Dr. Zelicoff: The possibility of aerosolizing variola (smallpox) and disseminating it for 10 miles (or more) has long been discounted by experts. Thus, instead of the initial tranche of smallpox cases being in the 10s or 20s, as most of the models have assumed, now we have the possibility of hundreds, or more likely thousands of victims should smallpox ever be utilized as a biological weapon. Heaven help us then, because the strategy we have adopted (vaccinate a few first responders now, and the population at large only in the case of an attack) will collapse if smallpox is introduced as an aerosol.
Dr. Lutwick: It was suggested that the 1971 Aralsk USSR outbreak that was recently revealed (by Zelicoff and colleagues) was related to aerosolization of a plume of smallpox virus from the notorious island of Vozrozhdeniye, where lots of BT testing was done (Tucker JB, Zilinskas RA, eds. CNS Occasional Papers: #9: The 1971 Smallpox Epidemic in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, and the Soviet Biological Warfare Program. Available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op9/index.htm). If that is the case, the virus was "hardened" (figuratively) to make it resistant to sunlight/UV inactivation. Even if that is true, I do not think it really matters, as even this strain required more classic person-to-person spread; a multicentric outbreak from bioterrorism through multiple geographically separate introductions (as might occur with "smallpox suicide bombers" — fanatics who are inoculated with smallpox and show up in a variety of locales late in their incubation periods) would produce a similar, albeit slower outbreak.
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